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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
DEON LOMAX CLOPTEN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20060254-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction on one count each of 
murder, a first degree felony; failure to respond to a police 
officer's signal to stop, a third degree felony; and possession 
or use of a firearm by a restricted person, a second degree 
felony (R. 612-14). This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal 
pursuant to the pourover provision of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2) (j) (West 2004) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in excluding 
expert testimony on the deficiencies of eyewitness identification 
where the court determined that the expert testimony would be 
redundant in light of the cautionary eyewitness identification 
instruction given to the jury? 
"Whether expert testimony on the inherent deficiencies of 
eyewitness identification should be allowed is within the sound 
discretion of the trial court." State v. Butterfield, 2001 UT 
59, 1 43, 27 P.3d 1133; accord State v. Hollen, 2002 UT 35, 5 66, 
44 P.3d 794 ("[t]he trial court has wide discretion in 
determining the admissibility of expert testimony" on eyewitness 
identification)(quoting State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1361 
(Utah 1993) ) . An appellate court will not reverse a trial 
court's decision to admit or exclude expert testimony "^unless 
the decision exceeds the limits of reasonability.'" Hollen, 2002 
UT 35, 1 66 (quoting Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1361). 
2. Can defendant prevail on an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim where he has failed to do more than baldly assert 
that the outcome of his trial would likely have been different if 
defense counsel had chosen a different strategy for impeaching a 
prosecution witness? 
3. Was trial counsel ineffective for failing to request a 
lesser included offense instruction where such an instruction 
conflicted with his defense theory of mistaken identification? 
In reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
this Court must determine whether trial counsel's performance was 
deficient and, if so, whether the deficient performance 
prejudiced defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
687 (1984); State v. Oliver, 820 P.2d 474, 478 (Utah App. 1991). 
This claim presents a question of law, reviewed on the record of 
2 
the underlying trial. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, M 
16-17, 12 P.3d 92. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Rule of Evidence 403, governing exclusion of relevant 
evidence on grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste of time, 
provides: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded 
if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with one count each of murder, a first 
degree felony; obstructing justice, a second degree felony; 
failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop, a third degree 
felony; and possession or use of a firearm by a restricted 
person, a second degree felony (R. 1-2). At trial, after one 
witness testified, defendant moved for a mistrial and the court 
granted the motion (R. 448-49, R. 641). After a second trial, a 
jury found defendant guilty of murder and failure to respond to 
an officer's signal to stop, but acquitted him of obstructing 
justice (R. 609-11).2 The trial court found defendant guilty of 
the bifurcated charge of possession of a firearm by a restricted 
person (R. 572-73). The court sentenced defendant to five years 
1
 In his closing argument, defense counsel conceded that 
defendant failed to respond to the officer's signal to stop (R. 
660: 26). 
3 
to life in the Utah State Prison on the murder charge, zero to 
five years on the failure to stop charge, and one to fifteen 
years on the possession charge. All sentences were ordered to 
run consecutive to any other sentences defendant was serving at 
the time. In addition, the sentences for murder and possession 
of a firearm were ordered to run consecutive to each other (R. 
612-14) . The court also ordered counseling and funeral costs for 
the victim's family (R. 661: 18-20). Defendant filed a timely 
appeal (R. 615). The Utah Supreme Court poured the case over to 
this Court (R. 622). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On the evening of December 1, 2002, Tony Fuailemaa and his 
girlfriend, Shannon Pantoja, went to a concert in downtown Salt 
Lake at Club X-Scape, where a rap group called Bone Thugs xn 
Harmony was playing (R. 645: 31-32). Based on the "nature of the 
concert," four undercover police officers in plain clothes also 
attended (Id. at 103-04). 
As Shannon and Tony approached the club, Shannon saw a group 
of four men standing by the entrance. Shannon exchanged 
greetings with one of the men on the way into the club (Id. at 
34-35). As she did so, defendant, also part of the group, turned 
to look at her (Id. at 35, 64, 99). Once inside the club, Tony 
asked Shannon if she knew "those guys." He asked especially 
about defendant, who was wearing a red sweatshirt and matching 
red sweatpants and whom Tony described as "all flamed up" (Id. at 
4 
35-36, 65, 100). Shannon told Tony she knew the man she had 
greeted by sight but did not know defendant (Id. at 36). Tony 
told her defendant's name, asked her if she saw his face, and 
commented that "xhe had had some problems with some of the homies 
out in the prison'" (Id. at 36, 66). Shannon and Tony then 
picked up their tickets and went to the concert (Id. at 33-34). 
Inside the venue, the four undercover officers "monitored 
the crowd, watch[ing] for problems" (Id. at 107). Detective Saul 
Bailey pointed out Shannon, whom he knew, to Officer Jason 
Mazuran (Id. at 110) . Both noticed the man in all red and 
thought he looked familiar, but neither could come up with his 
name at the time (Id. at 105-06, R. 646: 210). Towards the end 
of the concert, Officer Mazuran observed "some sort of 
confrontation or tension" between the man in red's group and Tony 
and Shannon (R. 645: 107-08). Mazuran testified, "There appeared 
to be a lot of tension between ^em, body language . . . that 
indicated . . . the two groups were, you know — disliked each 
other" (Id. at 110-11). The confrontation ended when the two 
groups "walked away from each other" (Id. at 111). 
Just before the concert ended, Tony and Shannon decided to 
leave to avoid the rush. Walking east on 100 South from West 
Temple, Shannon saw three of the four men from the group she had 
seen outside the club before the concert. She testified, "They 
were kind of like hiding behind - crouched behind the building . 
. . . They all three peeked out and then immediately ducked back 
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again. So, to me, it was obvious they were up to something" (Id. 
at 38). Tony and Shannon stopped walking, and Tony said to her, 
U,VI think I'm going to have some problems with these guys'" (Id. 
at 39). Although Shannon immediately suggested they go back to 
the club, Tony refused, not wanting to appear to be "a punk" (Id. 
at 39). 
Just then, defendant stepped out from a recessed doorway 
about ten feet away (Id. at 40, 72). With the hood of his red 
sweatshirt pulled up over his head, he walked towards Tony. His 
arm was fully extended, and he held a small black handgun (Id. at 
40, 43, 81). At very close range, defendant pulled the trigger, 
shooting Tony in the head and neck (Id. at 143; R. 646A: 23, 
30) .2 Tony dropped to the ground, Shannon began screaming, and 
defendant, along with the three other men, ran east on 100 South 
(Id. at 44, R. 646: 249). The medical examiner testified that the 
shot to Tony's head was "[v]ery quickly lethal" (Id. at 645: 
143) . 
Detective Bailey turned the corner onto 100 South just after 
the shots rang out (R. 645: 45-46/ R. 646: 194-95). He 
recognized Shannon and asked her "who did it" (R. 645: 46; R. 
646: 195). Shannon pointed east and answered, "It's the guy in 
2
 R. 646, part of the trial transcript, includes a 
separately-numbered excerpt from the preliminary hearing 
transcript. This excerpt, containing the testimony of an 
unavailable eyewitness, Christopher Hamby, is physically appended 
to the back cover of the trial transcript. The State will 
reference the excerpt as "R. 646A." 
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all red" (R. 645: 46). Detective Bailey and another officer saw 
a man dressed in red running away. The man in red turned a 
corner midway down the block. The officers gave chase on foot 
but had to slow down to check dark alcoves along the route for 
safety (R. 646: 195-97). The officers stopped where the man had 
turned, which was a driveway entrance into a parking lot (Id. at 
197) . 
Detective Bailey testified that when he looked south into 
the parking lot, he saw a white Ford Explorer heading towards 
him, "accelerating pretty good through the parking lot, I 
stepped . . . out of the center of tl le driveway and stepped, back 
onto the sidewalk to prevent being run over by the vehicle" (Id. 
at 198; id., at- 201). E 'roiti his sidewalk vantage point, Detective 
Bailey identified the driver as defendant, the man in red whom he 
had recognized earlier in the evening at the club but whose name 
he could not recall (Id. at 198-99). With his gun drawn and his 
identification visible, Bailey "challenged the vehicle and 
identified myself and ordered the driver to stop" (Id. at 199-
200). Defendant paused, looked startled, and then "hit the 
accelerator" (IcL. at 199, 201). 
Meanwhile, Officer Mazuran had gone to reposition his 
unmarked police car closer to the concert venue (R. 645: 112). 
En route, he heard shots and drove in the direction of the sound. 
Mazuran heard a woman screaming, saw a man on the ground, and saw 
Detective Bailey running east (Id. at 115). After talking 
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briefly with Bailey, Mazuran continued driving east. He 
There was a parking lot to my right. And I 
saw a vehicle coming at me at a high rate of 
speed. The vehicle came out and almost hit 
my passenger side rear end of the truck. And 
I came to almost a complete stop. 
The vehicle came out and came around my rear 
end and came up parallel to me. So my 
driver's side window was maybe 12, 16 inches 
from their passenger side window. 
My windows were rolled down. I looked to my 
left and observed the defendant driving, 
wearing the red suit. I immediately 
recognized him. I observed another male 
sitting next to him in the passenger side. 
And we looked each other right in the face 
right there in the middle of First South. 
He had an expression of, somewhat of fear, 
nervousness. We locked eyes, and I believed 
that we were going to have a shooting right 
in the middle of the street. 
Id. at 116-17. Officer Mazuran reached down, drew his gun, and 
flipped on his red and blue lights (Id.). As soon as the lights 
went on, defendant's vehicle accelerated down the street (Id.). 
Defendant turned north on Main Street, west on South Temple, 
and north on 400 west, with Officer Mazuran chasing him at speeds 
of up to 60 miles an hour (Id. at 118). As the vehicles 
approached Beck Street and Victory Road, three marked police cars 
joined the chase, driving at up to 100 miles an hour (Id. at 150-
51). The pursuit continued onto 1-15 North, reaching speeds of 
120 miles an hour (Id. at 153). Defendant finally pulled over 
near the 2600 South exit in Bountiful (Id. at 154). 
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Police conducted a felony stop of defendant and his three 
passengers (Id. at 154-55). Officers then contacted Detective 
Bailey, who brought Shannon to the scene to see if she could 
identify any of the four people in the vehicle (R. 645: 50; R. 
646: 207-08). En route, Shannon told Bailey that Deon Clopten 
was the shooter (R. 645: 53; R. 646: 210). At the scene, Shannon 
remained in the police car while each suspect was brought out 
individually, in front of bright police lights (R. 645: 51; R, 
646: 211). Shannon immediately and unequivocal! y identified 
defendant as the shooter (R. 645: 52-53; R. 646: 214-15).3 She 
identified the other three men -as those who had been wi th 
defendant at the club earlier that evening (R. 645: 53-54; R. 
646: 215-16). 
Three other key witnesses testified. Melissa Valdez also 
attended the concert that night. Standing in line outside the 
club before the concert, she talked with a man in a group of 
about four or five men about getting tickets (R. 646: 243-44). 
Later, like Shannon and Tony, Melissa and her date left the 
concert before it was quite over (Id. at 244). On the way back 
to the parking lot, they passed a couple on the street, and 
Melissa overheard them arguing about whether or not to return to 
the club (Id. at 244-45). Continuing east past the couple, 
Melissa saw the same man she had talked to earlier about tickets 
3
 A little more than a year later, Shannon again 
unequivocally identified defendant from an in-person lineup 
conducted at the sheriff's office (R. 645: 57-58). 
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approach her, heading west (Id. at 246) . He was wearing a red 
sweatshirt with the hood pulled over his head and matching red 
sweatpants. Recognizing him from the earlier conversation, she 
asked if had gotten into the club. The man responded, "yeah" as 
he passed by (Id. at 246-48). Melissa testified that the man's 
hands were in his sweatshirt pockets and "[h]e seemed very cold, 
like he was a man with a mission" (Id. at 248). 
Melissa and her date then came upon a man urinating against 
a wall (Id. at 249). Stepping over the resultant puddle, Melissa 
happened to look over her shoulder. At that moment, she heard a 
gunshot and saw defendant standing behind the victim with his 
right arm extended, holding what appeared to be a gun (Id. at 
249, 268). She began to run away. After she heard several more 
shots, the man who had been urinating and the man in red both ran 
past her (Id. at 250-51). Melissa reached the parking lot, met 
up with her date, and they got in Melissa's car to leave. 
Approaching the parking lot exit, Melissa realized that the 
shooter was in the white Ford Explorer right in front of her, 
along with three other men (Id. at 250, 266).4 Later, when 
presented with a photo array, Melissa twice identified defendant 
as the shooter (Id. at 255-56) . 
4
 The man with whom Melissa attended the concert also 
testified. Although reluctant to be involved in the case, he 
corroborated all the essential details of Melissa's testimony. 
See R. 647: 473-80, 483-87. 
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Christopher Hamby, another key witness, was unavailable to 
testify at trial. Consequent] y, hi s pre] 1 m i nary heari ng 
testimony was read to the jury (R. 646: 319-20). Hamby, who was 
visiting :rom out-of-state, went with his brother and his 
brother's two friends to the concert that night (Id. at 325). 
One of his brother's friends was defendant. Hamby testified 
that, while they were in the club, the victim "ran up on" 
defendant and they had a "commotion" (R. 646A: 21). Hamby 
stated, "[T]he victim and victim friends or associates surrounded 
Deon. Then I guess it was some of Deon's associates surrounded 
him , I seen it, but it didn't r^ all. / I > • «a 1 IMA/TI t :> no fight. 
They just all spread around and separated" (Id.). Hamby added, 
"[I]t was just a big commotion. It wasn't no angry-type 
situation" (Id^ at 22). 
Hamby testified that he, his brother, defendant, and another 
man named Freddie White left the concert early and returned to 
their vehicle. Hamby testified: 
We was going to the "Jeep." And when we got 
around the corner, [defendant] seen the guy, 
the victim. . . . And we walked on to the 
Jeep. [W]e was in the Jeep getting to 
leave . . . [and] Deon said, "I'm goin' to 
shoot him," in the angry manner. And he told 
Freddie to, "Hand me the gun." So Freddie 
handed him the gun. 
And everybody got out of the Jeep and walked 
back down. And he walked up on him close 
and, at point-blank range, he shot him in the 
back of the head. 
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(R. 646A: 23). Hamby also testified that defendant "threw on" 
the hood of his red sweatshirt when he was several feet away from 
the victim and that, as they were fleeing in the car after the 
shooting, defendant, who was driving, passed his gun to Freddie 
"and told him to throw it out [the window] and he threw it out" 
(Id. at 29, 33, 34) .5 
Finally, the State called Robert Land to testify. Land knew 
defendant from the state prison system, where they had been 
cellmates in the 1990fs (R. 646: 342). Land also knew Tony, the 
victim, from the Timpanogos section of the prison, colloquially 
known as "288" (Id. at 345). According to Land, some years 
earlier, two other inmates had been fighting with defendant in 
288, when defendant "started to get the better of the two" (Id. 
at 348). Tony, who had not been involved in the fight, 
intervened and hit defendant, thus ending the altercation (Id. at 
348-49) . Land testified that defendant held a grudge against 
Tony for his interference and, since the event, had considered 
him an "enemy" (Id. at 349, 351). 
Land met up again with defendant in December of 2002, when 
defendant was incarcerated for this offense (Id. at 343). Land 
5
 A man bicycling from Salt Lake to Bountiful on the night 
of the murder found two handguns in the gutter on Beck Street (R. 
645: 161-62). He secreted them in a bush and called the police 
the next day (Id. at 163). The state firearms examiner testified 
that the bullet casings found at the scene of the shooting came 
from the 9mm handgun found on Beck Street and that the bullet 
fragments found in the victim''s body were consistent with the 
same weapon (R. 646: 379, 380). 
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testified that defendant told him that he had seen Tony at the 
club on : night of 1:1: le concert and that Tony had said to him, 
"Do you remember 288?" (Id. at 346). Land stated that defendant 
"told [Tony], You better go call [your] mom because that's the 
last time [you'll] talk to her" (Id.), Land further stated that 
defendant told him he "domed" Tony, which Land explained meant to 
"shoot him in the head" (Id. at 352) . Defendant also told Laiid 
that they threw the guns out the window while fleeing by car 
towards Ogden (Id. at 353). 
The defense case rested on trying to introduce reasonable 
doubt that defendant was the shooter, TI: ie defense argued that 
either defendant or Freddie White, another passenger in the 
vehicle, could have been the shooter. Defendant's two sisters 
both testified that Freddie White told them that he was the 
shooter (R. 647: 491-93; 497, 501). They said that Brandon, 
Christopher Hamby's brother, was supposed to do the shooting, but 
that he became scared when the gun jammed, and that Freddie White 
did it instead (Id. at 491, 501). A third witness, a close 
friend of one of the sisters, testified that Freddie White told 
her that defendant was not the shooter and implied that he had 
pulled the trigger (Id. at 505-06, 511). She also told an 
investigator that Freddie White did the shooting after Brandon's 
gun jammed (Id. at 523). 
Additionally, this third witness told the investigator that 
Freddie White was wearing a red hooded sweatshirt on the night of 
13 
the killing (Id. at 523).6 For corroboration, the defense relied 
on the testimony of a man and woman staying on the 11th floor of 
the Marriott Hotel in a room overlooking 100 South (R. 646: 302). 
These witnesses testified that a man wearing a red jacket got in 
the passenger side of the getaway car (Id. at 304-05, 312-13). 
This testimony dovetailed with the testimony of Christopher 
Hamby, who was in the vehicle that night and who stated that 
Freddie White was on the passenger side of the vehicle (R. 646A: 
27) .7 
Citing Freddie White's alleged confession, the statement of 
the sister's friend to the investigator that Freddie White was 
wearing a red sweatshirt that night, and the observations of the 
Marriott Hotel guests that a man clad in a red jacket got in the 
passenger side of the getaway car, defense counsel argued that 
reasonable doubt existed that defendant was the shooter. 
The jury deliberated for just under three hours. It 
convicted defendant of murder and failure to respond to an 
officer's signal to stop and acquitted him of obstructing justice 
(R. 660: 63-64). The court found defendant guilty of the 
6
 A red hooded sweatshirt was found in the getaway vehicle. 
Officers did not seize it, however, because the clothing worn by 
the suspects when the vehicle was stopped matched the 
descriptions given by the witnesses at the scene of the killing 
(R. 646: 297). Moreover, Christopher Hamby corroborated that no 
one took off or put on a sweatshirt in the car after the shooting 
(R. 646A: 38). 
7
 Multiple witnesses agreed that defendant was the driver 
and, thus, not on the passenger side of the vehicle (R. 645: 117, 
156; R. 646: 198; R. 646A: 18, 27; R. 647: 523). 
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bifurcated charge of possession of a firearm by a restricted 
person (Id. 66). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant first" argues that the trial court erred as a 
matter of law when it excluded expert testimony on eyewitness 
identification. At the outset, defendant advocates a standard of 
review that does not and should not apply to expert eyewitness 
identification testimony. Under the proper abuse of discretion 
standard, the trial court's ruling to exclude the testimony 
because it was redundant in light of a cautionary instruction on 
the difficulties with eyewitness identification was not beyond 
the "limits of reasonability." State v. Hollen, 2002 UT 35, 1 
66, 44 P.3d 794. And, contrary to defendant/ s assertions, • 
cautionary instruction given by the trial court was adequate on 
its face. In any event, defendant approved the instruction and 
so invited any subsequent error. Finally, defendant has made no 
showing that the excluded testimony would have made any 
difference to the outcome of his trial. 
Defendant next argues that his counsel was ineffective for 
not investigating the terms of a prosecution witnes- federal 
plea agreement and then using the results of that investigation 
to impeach the witness. This argument fails because defense 
counsel explored the terms of the federal plea agreement, found 
it irrelevant, and so chose other means to impeach the witness. 
A lawyer's choice of trial strategy that does not produce the 
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desired result does not constitute ineffective assistance. The 
claim also fails because defendant's assertion of prejudice is 
purely speculative. 
Finally, defendant argues that his counsel performed 
ineffectively by failing to request a lesser included offense 
instruction on manslaughter. This argument fails because 
requesting such an instruction would have undermined the central 
defense theory of mistaken identity. Defendant argued that he 
was not the person who committed the crime. To request a 
manslaughter instruction would concede that he was the shooter. 
Because not requesting such an instruction was strategically 
sound in light of the articulated defense of mistaken identity, 
defendant did not perform deficiently. Moreover, his assertion 
of prejudice is speculative. For both reasons, his claim fails. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS 
DISCRETION IN EXCLUDING EXPERT 
TESTIMONY ON EYEWITNESS 
IDENTIFICATION WHERE IT DETERMINED 
THAT THE EXPERT'S LIMITED TESTIMONY 
WOULD BE REDUNDANT AND CONFUSING 
AND WHERE IT GAVE AN ADEQUATE 
CAUTIONARY JURY INSTRUCTION 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred as a matter of 
law when it excluded expert testimony on eyewitness 
identification. See Br. of Aplt. at 12-15. In his view, because 
the cautionary Long instruction, which warns juries of the 
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dangers inherent in eyewitness identification, failed to 
sufficiently inform the jury about key perceptual problems in the 
evidence, the expert should have been allowed to testify to 
remediate the deficiency.8 Id. at 18-20. Defendant's argument 
fails because he advocates a standard of review that does not and 
should not apply to expert eyewitness identification testimony. 
Under the correct standard of review, the trial court's decision 
fell well within the "limits of reasonability." State v. Hollen, 
2002 UT 35, 5 66, 44 P. 3d 794, Moreover, by approvii lg tl le jury':.'. 
instructions, defendant waived any objection to the specifics of 
the cautionary eyewitness identification ii isti: action . 
Defendant's argument grows out of decisions made by the 
trial court during defendant's first and second trials. Before 
defendant's first trial, after a hearing on the State's motion to 
exclude expert testimony on eyewitness identification, the court 
issued the following written ruling: 
The Plaintiff's Motion in Limine: Dr. Dodd's 
Testimony, is granted. Dr. Dodd's testimony 
is excluded. Dr. Dodd's testimony will not 
relate to specific facts of this case - has 
not interviewed witnesses. Testimony will 
cause confusion for the jury and would 
infringe upon province of jury to judge 
credibility. All of the factors as [sic] 
adequately covered in Long instruction. 
8
 Defendant also argues that the expert's testimony fell 
within the plain language of rule 702, governing expert witness 
testimony. See Br. of Aplt. at 15-17. The trial court, however, 
made clear that the witness's qualification as an expert was not 
at issue. Rather, the pivotal question was whether the expert's 
testimony would be helpful and, if so, how far it should go. See 
R. 637: 6; R. 638: 32, 37. 
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R. 474. Less than a week later, the court reversed its decision, 
stating, "I am going to let [Dr. Dodd] testify in very limited 
circumstances. Again, there will be no specifics in regards to 
this case. There will be nothing drawing any conclusions in 
regards to this case, he will not be able to invade the province 
of the jury in any way" (R. 640:7). Soon thereafter, for 
unrelated reasons, the court declared a mistrial (R. 448-49). 
Nine months later, in a pretrial hearing before defendant's 
second trial, the court once again considered the matter of 
expert testimony about eyewitness identification: 
The Court's preliminary ruling now, and as 
I've notified you, is now to exclude Dr. 
Dodd's testimony. It's the Court's decision 
that case law totally leaves that to the 
discretion of the Court. And I think the 
eyewitness identification instruction does an 
adequate job. And I think that Dr. Dodd's 
testimony at this point would only confuse 
the issue. 
{T]he record should reflect that the Court at 
one point was going to exclude Dr. Dodd's 
testimony. Then I reviewed the decision. 
Then I said that he would be allowed to 
testify in a limited fashion. 
And, since the delay in the trial and the 
setting of the new trial, the Court has 
reconsidered that position and decided that 
Dr. Dodd's testimony is just superfluous and 
would have no bearing on the jury's decision. 
All he would be able to do is testify to 
exactly what . . . the Long instruction 
states to the jury with regards to eyewitness 
identification. 
{T]he court's ruling was that Dr. Dodd could 
testify only to exactly what the Long 
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instruction gives. And I think it's 
redundant. And I think the Long instruction 
does a better job of explaining that. 
R. 644: 12-14. 
Highlighting the court's change of mind, defendant argues 
that the abuse of discretion standard for reviewing whether 
eyewitness identification testimony is admissible has produced 
arbitrary and capricious results. See Br. of Aplt. at 14-15. 
That is, before the first trial, the court admitted the expert 
testimony, albeit on a limited basis. After a mistrial and 
before the second trial, however, the court excluded the same 
evidence. In defendant's view, "[s]uch contrasting rulings 
cannot both be correct'' (Id. at 15) . 
If correction of error had been the applicable standard of 
review, then defendant's reasoning might be sound. Abuse of 
discretion, however, is a more expansive standard. Under it, an 
appellate court will reverse a decision to admit or exclude 
expert testimony only if "xthe decision exceeds the limits of 
reasonability.'" Hollen, 2002 UT 35, 1 66 (quoting Larsen, 865 
P.2d at 1361). The discretion exercised by the trial court 
xx
 ^ necessarily reflects the personal judgment of the court and the 
appellate court can properly find abuse only if . . . no 
reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial 
court.'" See State v. Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, 1 28, 48 P.3d 953 
(quoting State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978)) 
(brackets in original). Stated another way, "the appellate court 
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must uphold the trial court's ruling if it was within the zone of 
reasonable disagreement." Weatherred v. State, 15 S.W.3d 540, 
542 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). 
Pursuant to this standard, two judges presented with the 
same facts could rationally decide the same matter differently. 
Neither decision would be reversed on appeal unless "no 
reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial 
court." Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, 1 28 (citations omitted). 
Similarly, a single judge could reconsider a matter between 
trials, change positions, and also be affirmed on appeal, so long 
as the outcome remained within the bounds of reasonability. 
In the context of eyewitness identifications, whenever a 
court addresses a request to admit expert testimony, the court is 
faced with a dilemma. State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, 1 15, 48 
P.3d 953. If the court "[p]ermit[s] &n expert witness, either 
directly or indirectly, to analyze the credibility of a 
percipient witness for the jury," the expert, to some extent, 
"steps into the province of the jury." Id. On the other hand, 
if the court excludes expert testimony "about the limitations 
inherent in eyewitness identifications, the jury might not be 
educated about the potential deficiencies of eyewitness 
identification." Id. 
Here, the court struggled with the dilemma. Its ruling at 
the first trial admitted the expert evidence, but did so on a 
limited basis. The expert could not testify about specifics of 
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the case, could not draw any conclusions, and could not in any 
way invade the province of the jury (R. 640: 7). Before the 
second trial, the court reconsidered and decided not to admit the 
expert testimony at all. The court reasoned that the expert's 
testimony would be so limited as to add nothing to the Long 
instruction. Therefore, because it would simply be redundant, 
the court excluded it. These two rulings - one to admit on a 
very limited basis and one to exclude — are closely related. 
While different, both outcomes plainly fall within the zone of 
reasonability. Where the trial court articulated its reasons for 
ultimately excluding the testimony, it cannot be said that "no 
reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial 
court." Butterfield, 2001 UT 59 at 1 28 (quoting Gerrard, 584 
P.2d at 887). 
Defendant also argues that the Long instruction was 
inadequate and thus required supplementation by the expert 
witness. Specifically, he claims that the expert's testimony 
would have explained "how the stress of an event influences the 
ability to remember facial features," how "a weapon detracts from 
a person's ability to remember specific facial features," and 
"the unreliability of cross-racial identification" (Br. of Aplt. 
at 19-20). 
First, the instruction did tell the jury that it "should 
consider whether the capacity of the witness was impaired by . . 
stress or fright at the time of observation" (R. 595 at 
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addendum A). Second, while the instruction did not make specific 
mention of the impact of a weapon on eyewitness perception, it 
did caution the jury to consider "the presence or absence of 
distracting . . . activity during the observation" (R. 594 at 
addendum A). Third, the cautionary instruction specifically 
provided that the jury should consider "whether the witness is of 
a different race than the criminal actor. Identification by a 
person of a different race may be less reliable than 
identification by a person of the same race" (R. 595). 
The Long instruction is thus adequate on its face. But even 
assuming, arguendo, that the instructions did not fully cover all 
of the relevant factors, defendant invited any alleged error. 
The record reflects that the court gave defense counsel the 
opportunity to offer "any exceptions or objections to the Jury 
Instructions as proposed by the Court" (R. 647: 527). Defense 
counsel objected to the giving of only one instruction, not 
relevant here (Id.). Under such circumstances, he cannot now 
complain that the instructions were inadequate. See State v. 
Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, 1 54, 70 P.3d 111 (refusing to address a 
challenge to a jury instruction approved by defendant). 
Moreover, defendant did not avail himself of the opportunity 
to argue how each of the factors could have affected the 
perceptions and reliability of individual eyewitnesses. While 
defense counsel referred to the cautionary instruction in his 
closing argument, he stated only that "it's a really helpful 
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instruction" and that "it's very detailed as to the 
considerations you should take into your deliberations when you 
decide and are evaluating the testimony of the eyewitnesses" (R. 
660: 27). Where defendant neither objected to the cautionary 
instruction nor used it to argue the specifics of his case, he 
cannot now be heard to complain that it was inadequate. 
Defendant's argument fails for an additional reason. The 
Utah Supreme Court has held: 
[A] trial court's determination that expert 
testimony would amount to a lecture to the 
jury as to how they should judge the evidence 
and its subsequent refusal to admit such 
testimony into evidence xis not an abuse of 
discretion, particularly where there has been 
no showing that the excluded evidence would 
probably have had a substantial influence in 
bringing about a different verdict." 
Butterfield, 2001 UT 59 at 5 43 (quoting State v. Malmrose, 649 
P.2d 56, 61 (Utah 1982)); accord Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, 1 20. 
Here, defendant has made no showing that the excluded testimony 
would have made any difference to the outcome of his trial. 
Indeed, defendant's appellate argument wholly ignores the 
testimony of two key witnesses, Melissa Valdez and Christopher 
Hamby. Melissa talked with defendant both before the concert, 
while she was standing in line outside the venue, and after the 
concert, as she was walking back to her car. She recognized 
defendant from the conversation before the concert when she 
crossed paths with him after the concert. In both instances, she 
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was under no stress and saw no weapons.9 Moments after the post-
concert encounter, she heard a shot, turned around, and saw 
defendant standing behind the victim with his right arm extended, 
holding what appeared to be a gun (R. 646: 249). She later 
identified defendant from a photo array as the shooter (Id. at 
255, 258) . While Melissa was likely stressed when she turned 
around and saw defendant with the gun, the same plainly cannot be 
said of her two earlier, purely social interactions, on which her 
identification of defendant was based. 
Defendant also ignores the testimony of Christopher Hamby, 
who knew defendant, accompanied him on the night of the killing, 
and unequivocally maintained that defendant was the shooter (R. 
646A: 23, 30; R. 646: 327). Hamby' s testimony that defendant was 
the shooter did not involve a stranger identification and did not 
require a cautionary eyewitness identification jury instruction, 
much less expert testimony on the problems inherent in eyewitness 
identifications. His testimony was subject only to a credibility 
determination and, as long as the jury believed him, the jury 
could convict. 
Defendant also ignores the testimony of Officers Mazuran and 
Bailey who, while they did not witness the actual shooting, both 
recognized defendant at or near the scene, saw him running away 
and, moments later, encountered him again at close range as he 
9
 As to cross-racial identification, the record does not 
reveal Melissa's ethnicity. 
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drove out of a nearby parking lot. These officers and others 
visually tracked defendant's vehicle to the place on 1-15 where 
the high-speed chase finally ended. Moreover, the testimony of 
Officer Bailey dovetailed with the testimony of Melissa Valdez, 
Christopher Hamby, and Shannon Pantoja. 
Thus, defendant has failed to demonstrate how the excluded 
testimony "would probably have had a substantial influence in 
bringing about a different verdict." Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, 1 
43 (citation omitted). The trial court, therefore, did not abuse 
its discretion in excluding the expert testimony as "redundant," 
"confusing," and "superfluous" (R. 644: 12-14). 
POINT TWO 
DEFENDANT CANNOT PREVAIL ON A CLAIM 
OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE WHERE HIS 
COUNSEL EXERCISED SOUND TRIAL 
STRATEGY AND WHERE DEFENDANT HAS 
ONLY BALDLY ASSERTED THAT THE 
VERDICT WOULD LIKELY HAVE BEEN 
DIFFERENT IF COUNSEL HAD CHOSEN A 
DIFFERENT IMPEACHMENT STRATEGY 
Defendant argues that his trial counsel's performance was 
constitutionally ineffective because he did not "investigat [e] 
and obtain[] proof of a federal plea agreement relating to Robert 
Land, a key prosecution witness who claimed the defendant 
confessed to the shooting." Br. of Aplt. at 11. Defendant 
claims that had his counsel uncovered "what truly occurred" in 
the federal sentencing proceeding, he could have used that 
information to impeach Robert Land's testimony in this state 
court proceeding. Id. at 24. Absent such impeachment, he 
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concludes, Land's testimony—detailing defendant's motive for the 
killing and his confession to the crime—prejudiced the outcome of 
the trial. Id. 
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
defendant must carry the burden of demonstrating "(1) that 
counsel's performance was so deficient as to fall below an 
objective standard of reasonableness and (2) that but for [the] 
deficient performance there is a reasonable probability that the 
outcome of the trial would have been different." State v. Cruz, 
2005 UT 45, 5 38, 122 P.3d 543 (quotations omitted); see also 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). As to 
deficient performance, a reviewing court "indulge[s] a strong 
presumption" that trial counsel's performance comes within the 
wide ambit of "reasonable professional assistance." State v. 
Taylor, 947 P.2d 681, 685 (Utah 1997). As long as defense 
counsel has a rational, articulable basis upon which to act, 
deficient performance will not be found. State v. Tennyson, 850 
P.2d 461, 468 (Utah App. 1993). 
Defendant's argument for ineffective assistance is premised 
on establishing a significant link between this case and a 
federal case in which Land received a reduced sentence in 
exchange for revealing information about several criminal 
matters, including this one. Defendant argues generally that, 
had his counsel obtained the sealed records from Land's federal 
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case, he could have used the terms of the federal plea bargain t 
impeach Land's testimony in this case. 
Here, defense counsel thoroughly explored the federal 
proceeding as a possible source of impeachment in the state case 
On cross-examination of Robert Land, defense counsel introduced 
transcript of a meeting that had occurred in connection with the 
federal case (R. 646: 359-60). Robert Land had been charged 
under RICO and was facing a potential life sentence in federal 
prison (Id. at 360). When the meeting occurred, Land's counsel 
had already bargained down to 15 years in exchange for Land's 
testimony in the RICO case and was seeking an even lower 
sentence. Present at the "debriefing" meeting were Land, his 
federal attorney, an FBI agent, and a U.S. Attorney (Id. at 361, 
366). Land testified in this case that the FBI agent in the 
federal case 
had told me basically to lay out - that was 
part of the plea agreement - as to anything 
that I know to that [federal] case or 
anything else, basically anything that I 
know, to lay it out there. Because if I 
don't, then basically - you know, if I'm not 
truthful with them, then all it's going to do 
is make it worse for me. 
(Id. at 366). In this context, Land told the federal personnel 
what he knew about the murder involving Deon Clopten (Id. at 366 
67). 
On cross examination in this case, defense counsel further 
pursued the matter, inquiring into the sentence reduction 











The judge made that decision 
after the government filed a 
motion in your favor asking 
for that reduction, right? 
Putting that agreement out to 
the judge saying, This is what 
we recommend, the government 
did? 
They filed a motion for me to 
testify in federal court. 
They filed a motion asking 
that your sentence be reduced, 
right? 
Yes, for testifying in federal 
court. 
And it was reduced. 
Yes, it was. 
The government recommended 
eight years? 
No. 
How much did the government 
recommend? 
Robert Land: They recommended ten years, 
but the judge gave me -
Def. counsel: The judge gave you eight. 
Robert Land: - eight years. 
Def. counsel: But that was still better than 
the 15 they were recommending, 
right? 
Robert Land: Yes. 
Id. at 370-71. This testimony clearly establishes that Robert 
Land received a benefit in his federal sentence for testifying in 
the RICO case. As part of that plea bargain, Land told federal 
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officers what he knew about other criminal activities, including 
what defendant told him in prison about this case. As defense 
counsel fully explored, however, the federal case had no 
relationship to the state murder case. When Robert Land 
testified in this case, he had already received the benefit of a 
reduced sentence in the federal case. The federal sentence, 
having already been imposed, was not in any way contingent upon 
what he testified to in this state case. The two matters, as 
defense counsel established, were wholly unrelated. Counsel thus 
did not perform deficiently by not pursuing the sealed federal 
records because he had no reason to do so. The benefit Land 
received was undisputed and had nothing to do with Land's 
testimony in state court. 
Moreover, defense counsel did not ignore the issue of 
impeaching Robert Land. Indeed, counsel called two witnesses for 
the specific purpose of impeachment. First, counsel called 
Miguel Florez, Land's cousin and cellmate, who testified that 
Land and defendant did not get along and had no reason to talk to 
each other in prison (R. 647: 460). Second, counsel called Dejon 
Waldron, defendant's cellmate after the shooting. Waldron 
testified that when defendant became his cellmate, he told 
defendant that he was hostile towards Land and did not associate 
with him (Id. at 466). He also testified that, under the highly 
restricted conditions of maximum security, he never saw defendant 
and Robert Land talking together (Id.). Counsel used this 
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testimony to impeach Robert Land's testimony that defendant 
confessed to him in prison. 
The law is well-settled that "[a] lawyer's legitimate 
exercise of judgment in the choice of trial strategy that does 
not produce the anticipated result does not constitute 
ineffective assistance of counsel." State v. Wynia, 754 P.2d 
667, 672 (Utah App. 1988)(citing Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 
1101, 1109 (Utah 1983); State v. McNicolf 554 P.2d 203, 205 (Utah 
1976)). Because a rational basis existed for not pursuing sealed 
federal court documents and because counsel chose to impeach 
Robert Land's testimony by directly questioning others who were 
in prison with defendant at the time he confessed, counsel did 
not perform deficiently. See Tennyson, 850 P.2d at 468 (assuming 
counsel's competence where rational basis for attorney 
performance can be articulated) . 
Defendant's ineffectiveness claim also fails for lack of 
prejudice. To prevail on this prong, defendant must demonstrate 
that "but for the error, there [would be] a reasonable 
probability that the verdict would have been more favorable to 
the defendant." State v. Dunnr 850 P.2d 1201, 1225 (Utah 1993). 
Defendant's argument falls well short of the mark. 
First, defendant's claim of prejudice fails because it is 
purely speculative. He has not explained what was in the federal 
sentencing records or how they would have helped him prevail. He 
has not explained how he thinks the terms of the federal sentence 
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differed from what Land testified to in state court, how those 
unspecified terms would have made Land's testimony in the state 
case any less credible, or how Land's testimony served as the 
linchpin of the conviction. "On many occasions, this court has 
reiterated that proof of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot 
be a speculative matter but must be a demonstrable reality." 
Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993). Because 
defendant has produced nothing but a speculative claim of 
prejudice, his ineffective assistance claim fails. 
Second, even assuming arguendo that Land's testimony about 
defendant's confession and the motive for the killing had been 
successfully impeached, other evidence amply supported the jury's 
verdict. Shannon Pantoja witnessed the murder, identified 
defendant, and testified at trial. Melissa Valdez saw defendant 
with his arm outstretched, pointing the gun at the victim's head 
and, moments later, running away. Christopher Hamby was with 
defendant all evening and witnessed the murder. Two police 
officers placed defendant on the scene, saw a man dressed all in 
red flee from the scene and, moments later, identified defendant 
as he drove away from the scene. This evidence rendered Robert 
Land's testimony about the confession cumulative. And, while no 
one else testified about motive, motive is not a necessary 
element of the crime. Thus, even absent Robert Land's testimony, 
in light of the overwhelming evidence that defendant was the 
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shooter, there is no reasonable likelihood that the verdict would 
have been different. 
POINT THREE 
TRIAL COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE 
FOR FAILING TO REQUEST A LESSER 
INCLUDED OFFENSE INSTRUCTION WHERE 
SUCH AN INSTRUCTION CONFLICTED WITH 
HIS DEFENSE THEORY OF MISTAKEN 
IDENTIFICATION 
Defendant argues that his counsel performed deficiently by 
failing NNto request a manslaughter instruction as a lesser 
included offense of Criminal Homicide, Murder, a 1st degree 
felony." Br. of Aplt. at 25. He contends that if the court left 
the credibility of the witnesses entirely to the jury, then the 
evidence as to whether the crime committed was manslaughter or 
murder should have gone to the jury. Id. at 26. Defendant makes 
no separate showing of how this allegedly deficient performance 
prejudiced the outcome of his trial. 
Defendant's claim fails on both prongs of the 
ineffectiveness analysis. As to deficient performance, the law 
is well-settled that "when counsel has failed to take a 
particular action, a [reviewing court] must determine whether 
such failure was justified by tactical or other considerations." 
State v. Colonna, 766 P.2d 1062, 1066 (Utah 1988). Here, the 
defense theory was mistaken identity—that Freddie White, not 
defendant, was the shooter. Such a defense conflicted with a 
manslaughter instruction. To request such an instruction would 
have been akin to asserting, "My guy didn't shoot the victim, but 
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if he did, he only committed manslaughter." Had defense counsel 
asserted such a position, he plainly would have undermined the 
primary defense that defendant was not the person who committed 
the crime.10 Because not requesting a manslaughter instruction 
was strategically sound in light of the mistaken identity theory 
on which defendant relied, defense counsel did not perform 
deficiently. Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1225. 
Defendant's claim may alternatively be disposed of for 
failure to demonstrate that, but for his counsel's allegedly 
deficient performance, he would have enjoyed a reasonable 
probability of a better trial outcome. State v. Arquelles, 921 
P.2d 439, 441 (Utah 1996). Here, defendant simply asserts 
prejudice, without offering any supporting explanation or 
argument. The law is well-settled that a conclusory proclamation 
of prejudice cannot establish prejudice as a demonstrable 
reality. Id. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
conviction on one count each of murder, a first degree felony; 
10
 Indeed, even in this appeal, reflecting the evidence 
adduced at trial, defendant's appellate counsel aptly described 
the crime as "an execution type shooting." Br. of Aplt. at 5. 
Counsel stated that "[the victim] was shot at close range in the 
head. The State's theory was that the shooter was [defendant]. 
The defense theory was that the shooter was Freddie White." Id. 
The only disputed factual issue in this case, both in the trial 
court and on appeal, was the identity of the shooter. No one 
asserted at any juncture in the proceedings that this was 
anything but a murder. 
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failure to respond to a police officer's signal to stop, a third 
degree felony; and possession or use of a firearm by a restricted 
person, a second degree felony. 
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Addendum A 
INSTRUCTION NO. J i f\ 
An important question in this case is the identification of the defendant as the person who 
ommitted the crime. The prosecution has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt, not 
nly that the crime wras committed, but also that the defendant was the person who committed 
ie crime. If, after considering the evidence you have heard from both sides, you are not 
onvinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is the person who committed the crime, 
ou must find the defendant not guilty. 
The identification testimony that you have heard was an expression of belief or 
npression by the witness. To find the defendant not guilty, you need not believe that the 
ientification witness was not insincere, but merely that the witness wras mistaken in his or her 
elief or impression. 
Many factors affect the accuracy of identification. In considering whether the 
rosecution has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is the person who 
ommitted the crime, you should consider the following: 
1. Did the witness have an adequate opportunity to observe the criminal actor? In 
nswering this question, you should consider: 
(a) the length of time the witness observed the actor; 
(b) the distance between the witness and the actor; 
(c) the light or lack of light at the place and time of observation 
(d) the presence or absence of distracting noises or activity during the 
observation; 
(e) any other circumstance affecting the opportunity of the witness to observe 
the person committing the crime. 
(f) the extent to which the actor's features were visible and undisguised. 
S^M 
2. Did the witness have the capacity to observe the person committing the crime? In 
answering this question, you should consider whether the capacity of the witness was impaired 
by: 
(a) stress or fright at the time of observation; 
(b) personal motivations, biases or prejudices; 
(c) fatigue or injury. 
(d) uncorrected visual defects. 
3. Whether the witness is of a different race than the criminal actor. Identification 
by a person of a different race may be less reliable than identification by a person of the same 
race. 
4. Was the identification of the defendant by the witness completely the product of 
the witness' own memory? In answering this question, you should consider: 
(a) the length of time that passed between the original observation of the 
witness and the identification of the defendant by the witness; 
(b) the mental capacity and state of mind of the witness at the time of the 
identification: 
(c) the exposure of the witness to opinions, to photographs, or to any other 
information or influence that may have affected the independence of the 
identification of the defendant by the witness; 
(d) any instance when the witness failed to identify the defendant; 
(e) any instances when the witness gave a description of the actor that is 
inconsistent with the defendant's appearance; 




You may take into account that an identification made by picking the defendant from a 
group of similar individuals is generally more reliable that an identification made from the 
defendant being presented alone to the witness. 
You may also take into account that identifications made from seeing the person are 
generally more reliable that identifications made from a photograph. 
If, after considering the evidence you have heard from the prosecution and from the 
defense, and alter evaluating the eyewitness testimony in light of the considerations listed above, 
you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is the person who committed the 
crime charged, and you find all of the other elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, 
you must find the defendant guilty of the crime charged. 
If, on the other hand, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
was the person who committed the crime charged you must find the defendant not guilty of the 
crime charged. 
